Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory by Sloan, Geoffrey
 1 
Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy, and the Generation of Fighting Power: 
Genesis and Theory 
‘Let us learn to think in the same way about fundamental truths’ 
Darrieus 
 
It was the British maritime strategist, Sir Julian Corbett who, on the eve of the 
First World War, described doctrine as:” the soul of warfare”1.This  conceals as much as 
it reveals, leaving out any explanation of how doctrine is formulated, disseminated or 
used, and the  relationship between doctrine and command philosophy. It is only through 
a synthesis of these two factors that fighting power can be generated.  Doctrine‟s ultimate 
function can be described as a force multiplier in that a fighting organization that applies 
it consistently will be able to take on a larger force in battle and win. It is often analyzed 
and evaluated in isolation of command philosophy. How do we define doctrine and what 
are the major variants of command philosophy? What is the nature of the relationship 
between doctrine and command philosophy? Is it possible to identify and assess the 
component parts of doctrine, and to understand how they manifest themselves at the 
tactical, operational and strategic levels of war?   
 The important context for answering these questions is the fighting power of a 
state‟s armed forces which is a product of physical factors (eg human resources, 
equipment):moral factors(eg leadership, management and motivation)and conceptual 
factors(eg doctrine , force development and the principles of war). Both the physical and 
the moral component feed into and are dependent on the conceptual component.
2
 It is the 
sustained functioning of this nexus, when combined with the appropriate command 
philosophy, that creates a force multiplier effect. This synthesis has the ability to generate 
fighting power. 
The first question is how do we define doctrine? The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation  interprets it as “ fundamental principles by which military forces guide 
their actions in support of objectives”.3 This spartan definition does not help to answer 
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one important question that needs to be addressed. How do you understand and evaluate 
doctrine as an object of thought? This can only be achieved by highlighting a number of 
interrelated perspectives. In one sense doctrine, if it is interpreted literally, means what is 
taught. The word comes from the Latin term doctrina meaning teaching. This in turn 
raises the question , who is it taught to? The term had utility in the context of the Roman 
Catholic Church. It was used to designate the accepted and correct articles of faith taught 
by the church. Although the term can be said to predate the Catholic Church. Doctrine 
can also be understood as a set of corporate beliefs or the principles which guide an 
organization on how it interacts with a wider environment. 
The second perspective in understanding doctrine as an object of thought is to 
conceive it as embodying the vital link between theory and practice. As far as military 
doctrine is concerned this can be said to have its roots in the early drill manuals such as 
those promulgated by Maurice of Nassau in the 17
th
 Century.
4
 The modern concept of 
doctrine attempts to avoid being overly prescriptive the aim being to ensure that a descent 
into dogma
5
 was avoided. Instead the objective was to develop a conceptual framework 
that would be the most effective in terms of undertaking military operations. One of the 
criteria for measuring this effectiveness is the degree to which military doctrine acted as a 
force multiplier. Doctrine can be conceived as a bridge between thought and action .It 
interprets ideas about war and how they affect its conduct and its character by combining 
strategic theories and operational plans into functional guidelines for action. Put another 
way military doctrine articulates war.
6
It is important to stress that definitions and the 
relationship between these elements have not always been clear: ”Military writers do not 
agree on definitions of the terms strategy, military doctrine, and tactics. In simplest terms, 
however, tactics is the study of how battles will be fought. In my view, once one begins 
to ask questions about how battles will be fought, one has entered the realm of military 
                                                 
4
 Maurice of Nassau (1567-1625) organised the rebellion against Spain into a coherent ,successful revolt 
.He used drill not just to instil discipline or to keep men physically fit, but also to disseminate tactics. This 
change affected the conduct of warfare as it required officers to train men in addition to leading them. It 
also decreased the size of an infantry unit for functional purposes as more specific orders could be given. It 
also required more initiative and intelligence from the average soldier.    
5
 Dogma in this sense is interpreted as an established belief that is unchanging. 
6
 This phrase is taken from the title of a doctoral thesis submitted to Reading University in 2009.See FN 9. 
 3 
doctrine .When one begins to ask which wars will be fought ,or if war should be fought 
one has entered the realm of strategy.”7        
The final perspective in understanding doctrine as an object of thought is to 
understand what this bridge consists of. More specifically what processes have to be 
undertaken for doctrine to have a force multiplying effect? Colin Gray has argued for the 
need to recognize a compulsory partnership with respect to one of the key dimensions of 
this bridge: ”Strategy and doctrine, doctrine and strategy, are necessary partners. Strategy 
decides how policy‟s goals are to be advanced and secured, and it selects the instrumental 
objectives to achieve these goals .Military doctrine, for its vital part, explains how armed 
forces of different kinds should fight .Doctrine should be the subordinated party in their 
necessary partnership, but such is by no means the case. The reason is because the 
doctrines with which armed forces implement strategy must shape the expectations and 
the plans of strategists.”8  
                   Perhaps the most important aspect is the winning of institutional 
approval: “Military theory is the body of ideas that concern war, especially those that are 
involved in the organization for training and fighting war. Doctrine is that accepted body 
of ideas concerning war. The acceptance of ideas can be the result of long-term usage or 
official sanctioning by the appropriate military authorities in a particular Service branch, 
nation or specific group. After examination and acceptance by highly experienced 
professionals that constitute the various review groups and doctrine committees, theory 
and best practice becomes doctrine”.9Apart from institutional approval doctrine needs to 
provide enablers to succeed in warfare. In evaluating this critical quality of the doctrine 
bridge, it has to contain one key element namely “a set of beliefs about the nature of 
war.”10  
Doctrine at the tactical, operational, and strategic level of war performs different 
functions which are linked together. At the strategic level doctrine provides direction and 
understanding. At the operational level doctrine provides understanding and instruction. 
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Finally, at the tactical level doctrine provides instruction and training. Doctrine should 
also be regarded as a seamless web: it should define how an armed force trains in peace, 
the weapon systems that it procures, and the way it fights in war. There is also a critical 
difference between doctrine and a set of orders. While both are authoritative, the former 
requires judgement in application, and is dependant on the nature of the orders which are 
received. This gives doctrine its unique character and underlines both its strengths and 
weaknesses in the trinity of components that contribute to the generation of fighting 
power. It can become dated very quickly. Therefore there is an onus on senior 
commanders to ensure that doctrine changes as circumstances, character and the conduct 
of a particular war dictate. In this sense doctrine is potentially an unstable phenomenon. 
The danger is to rely on its permanence and so fail to re-assess its relevance and to re-
acquire doctrine in the light of new circumstances. It is easy for doctrine to become 
dogma and in due course fail to act as a force multiplier.  
The other key quality doctrine needs is an ability to steer transition. It must start at 
the tactical level and ultimately produce tempo. This quality, or the lack of it, has been 
well summarized in the context of the recent conflict in Iraq: ”We failed to apply our 
tactical doctrines to operational effect in the pursuit of strategic goals. At the heart of 
successful tactics is the concept of transition-the ability to switch between operations of 
war. Get your transitional procedures right and tempo-the ability to outpace your enemy 
on the battlefield- follows naturally”.11 This ability to steer transition can be said to 
represent one of the vital prerequisites of tactical doctrine. 
Having identified a number of interrelated perspectives that enable doctrine to be 
understood as an object of thought, it is intended to outline the two major variants of 
command philosophy. In one sense any command system has a simple aim: to bring 
about the correct alignment of authority and responsibility among the various levels in a 
military hierarchy: ”Without striking a correct balance between centralization and 
decentralization, discipline and initiative, authority and individual responsibility, it is 
impossible for any organization, let alone a military one, operating as it does in an 
environment where disorder and confusion are endemic-to function or ,indeed exist.”12                 
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The first variant can be described as centralised control. The German word Befehlstaktik 
(orders based tactics) refers to this concept. This restrictive approach informs the 
command chain why, when, and critically how operations will be carried out. The second 
variant is often referred to as Auftragstaktik (mission based tactics).This approach 
informs the command chain why and when operations will be carried out, but, critically 
delegates the how to the initiative of officers in the command structure.
13
 It is often 
referred to as mission command. Giving practical expression to this is not 
straightforward: ”Mission Command is a complex ,elusive  and multi-factorial 
phenomenon not easily quantified or measured”.14      
In terms of land warfare the latter approach has been closely identified with the 
Prussian military tradition. This second variant has its origins in the social structures and 
ethos of Prussia: “This was a tradition that harkened back to the old Prussian social 
system, particularly the distinct social contract between the king and the Junker nobility. 
In return for the Junker‟s fealty and service, the king allowed them near total control over 
the peasants in their domains. This arrangement was extended to the general‟s 
relationship with his troops who could deploy them in any operational manner that he 
saw fit.”15 The crucial relationship between doctrine and command philosophy had 
developed further by the nineteenth century. German military reformers and thinkers such 
as Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, the Elder stressed that “adherence to a battle plan 
must not be allowed to crush the initiative of individual commanders and that the 
Feldherr (Theatre Commander) must have the courage and wit to change his dispositions 
as the situation required.”16. This relationship evolved, and in the post- First World War 
era, underwent what could be described as a renaissance. Prior to and during the First 
World War the German Army operated on a command philosophy known as 
Weisungsfuhrung (leadership by directive)
17
. This devolved responsibility down to army 
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or corps commanders and gave them broad discretionary power in the execution of their 
missions. This approach facilitated the development of fluid, nonlinear infiltration tactics 
supported by neutralizing artillery fire that the Germans used to great tactical advantage 
during Operation Michael in 1918. 
It was the first head of the inter-war German Army, General Hans von Seeckt 
who set in motion further developments that were to have a radical impact on both 
German doctrine and mission command. This could be described as a tripartite approach. 
First from his own operational experience, on the Eastern front, during the First World 
War he had witnessed how better trained, better led and better equipped forces  could 
decisively defeat much larger enemy forces. In the aftermath of the war he set up fifty 
seven committees and sub-committees staffed by 400 officers who would write 
assessments of the effectiveness of German tactics, regulations, equipment, and doctrine. 
The aim was to put the recent experience of war into some coherent context. These 
officers were given clear instructions as to what they were expected to achieve: “The 
officers named to committees were to write short, concise studies on the newly gained 
experiences of the war and consider the following points :a).What new situations arose in 
the war that had not been considered before? b).How effective were our pre-war views in 
dealing with the above situations? c).What new guidelines have been developed from the 
use of weaponry in the war? d).Which new problems put forward by the war have not yet 
found a solution?”18.  
The second aspect was the development one of the conceptual components of  
fighting power: force development. This perspective was both fresh and innovative: ”His 
vision of a Neuzeitliches Heer (modern army) was of special importance to him and 
became the core of his innovative thinking ,even if the restrictions of the Versailles treaty 
made sure that it remained only a vision. This army would be characterized by a small 
number of soldiers, who would be well trained and equipped. This would enable the army 
to conduct a highly mobile war, which Seeckt saw as the key to success in future 
conflicts.”19  
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The third element was based on a vision of a need for further doctrinal 
development. This process was taking place at a time when the German General Staff had 
been abolished under the Treaty of Versailles, and the Truppenamt (Troop Office ) had 
been developed as a substitute: ”Under Seeckt‟s guidance, the German army developed 
the theory and doctrine for a quick war of manoeuvre which would lead to an early 
decision and fast annihilation of the enemy force. This idea offered some chance for 
straightforward victory –once the army was expanded and modern equipment acquired”20    
A comparative analysis of the British and German approaches is instructive. 
“Whereas the Germans assigned experienced officers to analyze tactics-the lowest 
ranking army officers assigned to tactical doctrine studies in 1919-1920 were experienced 
captains who had been admitted to full membership in the General Staff corps-the British 
War Office in 1920 assigned the task of rewriting the infantry tactical manual to Liddell 
Hart, a twenty-four-year old lieutenant of limited experience.”21 Between 1921 and 1923 
the Reichswehr published a new tactical doctrine universally known as a “Das FuG”22. 
This publication was revolutionary in a number of ways: first it fused together doctrine 
and a variant of command philosophy while also absorbing many of the tactical 
developments of the First World War; secondly, prior to 1914 each arm of the German 
Army had its own publication governing command philosophy and tactics. Not 
surprisingly this had caused confusion. Das FuG brought together all these disparate 
approaches into a single publication which remained in use without modification until the 
early 1930s.  
Finally, the cardinal factor embedded in Das FuG was the extension downwards, 
in the command structure, of discretionary power in the execution of a mission. This 
principle was devolved to both squad leaders, and even to individual soldiers. Writing in 
1925 in his Observations of the Chief of the Army Command ,General Hans von Seeckt 
noted: “The principle thing now is to increase the responsibilities of the individual man, 
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particularly his independence of action, and thereby to increase the efficiency of the 
entire army…..The limitations imposed by exterior circumstances causes us to give the 
mind more freedom of activity, with the profitable result of increasing the ability of the 
individual.”23. 
This radical idea was subsumed under the existing command philosophy of 
Auftragstaktik, and was to become incorporated in the seminal German doctrine manual 
of the 1930s- Die Truppenfuhrung. This view of the future of war was not the only one 
that was articulated in  the German Army of this period : “Running parallel to this was a 
doctrine of delaying defence that had been formulated  by General Beck in the early 
1920s, and had become firmly established. It has been suggested that it was not without 
its dangers. While it enabled the defenders to withstand a higher attack–to–defence ratio, 
the doctrine was clumsy and dangerous in the hands of a non-expert”.24  Die 
Truppenfuhrung, was published in two parts the first in 1933 and the second in 1934. It 
fused together doctrine and command philosophy in a way that was then unique to land 
warfare. It has been described as :”The finest exposition of the nature of war at the 
operational level ever written
25.” This publication also built upon the reforms initiated by 
Von Seeckt. He wanted to build a more cohesive force that was built on trust, mutual 
respect and comradeship irrespective of social background or one‟s position in a military 
rank structure. This change of culture enabled mission- type orders to have a dynamic 
impact at the tactical level which was unique at the time.: “For Auftragstaktik to work, a 
subordinate leader or even a common soldier given a mission must fully understand his 
commander‟s intent-and in most cases ,the intent of the next higher commander. This of 
course implies that the subordinate leader must understand “why”. If he doesn‟t 
understand, he has the obligation to ask. Conversely, the superior leader issuing the 
orders has the obligation to explain”26. 
This cultural revolution in military affairs is also reflected in the Introductory 
section of Die Truppenfuhrung. This part of the manual contained fifteen paragraphs 
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which created a synthesis between doctrine and command philosophy which was and is 
unique. The tenth paragraph for example underlines clearly the extent to which a 
profound cultural change had been brought about in terms of the relations between 
officers and enlisted men. “The decisive factor, despite technology and weaponry, is the 
value of the individual soldier. The wider  his experience in combat the greater his 
importance. The emptiness of the battlefield (die Leere des Gefechtfeld) requires soldiers 
who can think and act independently, who can make decisive, and daring use of every 
situation, and who understand that victory depends on each individual”.27 The 
introduction also sets out very clearly another cultural innovation. Paragraph eight insists  
that both officers and enlisted men have a responsibility for leadership: “The example 
and personal bearing of officers and other soldiers who are responsible for leadership has 
a decisive effect on the troops. The officer, who in the face of the enemy displays 
coolness, decisiveness, and courage, carries his troops with him…….Mutual trust is the 
surest foundation for discipline in times of need and danger”.28 
It is important to stress that the formulation of an appropriate doctrine and use of 
a pertinent command philosophy are only part of the challenge that military organizations 
face .Perhaps the greater challenge is the dissemination of doctrine. This is best achieved 
through training; it is this activity that validates doctrine. It was the approach followed  
by the German army: ”At the heart of German training was the inculcating of a 
progressive, universally taught doctrine: a set of basic assumptions ,beliefs and operating 
instructions that all German troops irrespective of service, learned and were expected to 
follow. Adherence to this modern, uniform and realistic doctrine, enshrined in the 1936 
Truppenfuhrung (Troop Leadership Manual), was one of the great strengths of the 
German Army”.29                      
Of the two variants of command philosophy that have been outlined, 
Auftragstaktik fused with a manoeuvre  doctrine gave the German Army the potential to 
generate fighting power. It is important to understand the nature of the challenge that 
these two command philosophies were designed to meet. They both represented an 
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attempt to do the same thing: to exercise command and control (leadership and 
management) in the context of war: ”Modern war is distinguished above all by its speed 
and the need for close co-operation between many kinds of specialized troops. This 
means that other things being equal a command system that allows for initiative on the 
lowest level and for intelligent co-operation between subordinate commanders ,is likely 
to be superior to one that does not”.30      
It is pertinent at this point to establish exactly what Corbett meant by his aphorism 
that doctrine is the ‟soul of warfare‟. It provides us with a way of understanding the 
relationship between two sets of phenomena: the nature of war, its changing character 
and conduct and doctrine. By its nature war is fought in an environment of uncertainty, 
fear, danger, and ambiguity: “The resort to war is also a choice for unpredictably which is 
not simply the uncertain nature of battle, but the very nature of war”31 There is also the 
problem of commanders having to rely on information that is only partially accurate, and 
the risk that some of the information that they will use will be a product of deception by 
the enemy. It is this changing context within which doctrine has to succeed or fail. 
Coupled to this is the challenge of understanding the kind of conflict an armed force is 
going to be involved in. Assessing that correctly is critical, as it will affect how one side, 
at least, conducts its operations. Clausewitz recognized the importance of what is an 
intellectual task: ”The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgement that the 
statesman and the commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they 
are embarking, neither mistaking it for nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to 
its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”32.It is 
in the process of answering this premier question that the departure point for the 
formulation of doctrine can be discerned. It is at this juncture  we can understand  the 
pivotal importance of Corbett‟s aphorism about doctrine. 
Having established the relationship between the nature of war, and the importance 
of assessing correctly its character, and formulating, disseminating and applying an 
appropriate doctrine ,it is important to ask two important questions about doctrine itself. 
                                                 
30
 M.van Creveld ,Fighting Power,London :Arms and Armour press ,1983 p35.  
31
 J.Black, What is War? Some Reflections on a Contested Concept, RUSI Journal December 2007 vol 152 
no6 p45. 
32
 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed and trans, Michael Howard and Peter Paret Princeton NJ:Princeton 
University Press,1979,p88-89.   
 11 
Firstly, what are the component elements of doctrine? Secondly, how do these 
components affect the way that doctrine is formulated, disseminated and implemented at 
the three levels of war? In 1997  Professor Gooch identified six diverse components that 
produce doctrine. They were set out as follows: 
 The nature of weapons technology 
 The influence of formative experiences 
 Organisational and institutional interests 
 Ideology 
 National culture 
 The political and strategic situation  33  
It can be suggested that there is a lacunae in this component based approach to doctrinal 
theory. Gooch does not evaluate critically how these components manifest themselves at 
the three different levels of war. The cumulative insights derived from exploring this 
aspect will further facilitate an understanding of how doctrine has enabled the generation 
of fighting power. 
Before investigating these components it is important to state that other writers have 
developed alternative interpretations of doctrine. Barry Posen views doctrine as having 
three dimensions :offensive ,defensive, and deterrence. In addition, there are the 
categories of innovative or stagnant doctrine, and integration with national policy or the 
lack thereof.
34
This view of doctrine has been influential on other writers in the field. 
Elizabeth Kier states in a footnote: ”I have used Barry Posen‟s definitions of offensive 
and defensive military doctrines”.35Posen‟s approach can be characterized as one where 
the varieties of doctrine fused with a broad definition are sufficient to critically evaluate 
the sources of British, French and German in the inter-war period. 
By contrast Gooch‟s doctrinal components enables the effectiveness of a specific doctrine 
to be investigated with greater precision. This is important for two reasons. First doctrine 
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represents the link between  thought and action. Secondly, as previously stated,
36
 there is 
an onus on senior commanders to ensure that doctrine changes as the circumstances , 
character and the conduct of a particular war dictates. The circumstances in which 
doctrine will be formulated  will be unique. This analytical approach helps to understand 
how the components of a specific doctrine had utility. It is also important to stress that a 
doctrine has an impact on more than just the enemy .There is the requirement for doctrine 
to be alliance friendly: ”Doctrine to be of value must guide thought and appropriate 
action or it will not act as the binding agent of all the separate operational 
practices…doctrine must be sufficiently encompassing to accommodate the allies.”37                                
 
Gooch‟s first component, weapons technology, is by far the most important. It is part of 
the :” compound alignment of technology, doctrine and command philosophy that can 
generate fighting power”38.There is no doubt that certain technological developments in 
metallurgy, gunpowder, and the invention of weapons such as the crossbow gave their 
possessors tactics an ability to steer transition that enabled them to have operational 
effect and achieve strategic objectives. Yet technology was and is only an enabler. What 
really mattered was the doctrine within which this technology was employed. This 
process of conceptualization was not automatic. It often took a number of years for a 
particular doctrine to emerge, and was also dependant on another of the components that 
will be examined later such as- organizational and institutional interests. The 
development of combined arms warfare in Germany in the interwar period was a good 
example of this.
39
The analysis of the use of tanks during the First World War was the 
first step. Heinz Guderian came to the conclusion that without mechanical assistance 
even the German infantry of 1918 would pay a heavy cost to achieve a breakthrough. 
Perhaps more importantly events had shown that the German Army had been unable to 
develop that transitory quality in their tactical doctrine during Operation Michael, and 
ultimately failed to have an operational effect and facilitate the achievement of strategic 
objectives. 
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Technology can act like a double edged sword. It can initially affect a particular level of 
war, and weapons technology can increase the importance of a level of war, and 
ultimately require a riposte from the opposing side: ”The first great wave of technologies 
privileged above all firepower, strategic mobility, and strategic communications. The 
result in the First World War was tactical and operational immobility and the horror of 
immense losses for virtually no visible gain.”40 In essence doctrine can bequeath force 
generating advantages at one level and present profound challenges at other levels of war.    
The manifestation of this kind of doctrinal challenge can be illustrated by the British 
Army in the First World War. It was not until 1918 that the British Army produced an 
effective operational level doctrine that facilitated the achievement of strategic 
objectives. This was  British Expeditionary Force‟s (BEF)  Division in Attack-S135.This 
was the doctrine that was used during the successful „Hundred Days‟ campaign from 
August to November 1918.
41
   
 
The second component of doctrine is the influence of formative experiences. Military 
organizations are often accused of fighting the last war. The challenge to any armed force 
is the need to distil the continuities from the discontinuities. The logic would then be to 
build a new doctrine of the foundation stone on the former. This would then inform the 
tactical, operational and the strategic levels of doctrine. While the past cannot be a sure 
signpost to the future Gooch suggests that: ”It can, nonetheless, be of some assistance to 
those whose present-day task is to write the doctrine of tomorrow”42.It can provide a 
comprehension as to whether the ability to steer transition was in evidence at the tactical 
level. The other problem is that peace presents unique problems in terms of developing 
new doctrines based on the experiences of the past: ”The basic problem is that military 
organizations can rarely replicate in times of peace the actual conditions of war. It 
becomes increasingly easy as the complexities, ambiguities, and frictions of combat 
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recede into the past, for militaries to develop concepts, doctrines, and practices that meet 
the standards of peacetime efficiency rather than those of wartime effectiveness”43.So the 
period during which a fighting organization has the opportunity to place the experiences 
of a recent conflict into a broader light is laced with distracting challenges. The most 
prominent is the temptation to set aside painful experiences which then have to be re-
learnt at a later date.  
 
The experience of the United States Army is instructive in this respect. When it left 
Vietnam in 1973 it faced two broad challenges. It found itself having to align the 
organization with one of the other components of doctrine - the political and strategic 
situation. The Nixon Doctrine of 1969 placed a re-emphasis on the defence of Western 
Europe over other parts of the world. Secondly, American statesmen and commanders 
had failed to successfully answer the premier Clausewitzian question with respect to the 
nature of the war they were fighting. This failure in turn had consequences: ”The 
politico-military leadership had lost any moral or professional credibility it may have 
enjoyed. The war had not supplied this army with institutional heroes around whom the 
faithful could rally. Under the circumstances, neither vision or visionary seemed 
possible.”44Worse than this, the inappropriate configuration  of the US Army had  been 
recognized by only a handful of officers : ”I felt that we sent an army to Vietnam that was 
not prepared to fight the war. We sent an army that was top heavy in administrators and 
logisticians and bloody thin on fighters, not trained for the war. I felt that we didn‟t 
understand the nature of the war in the military”45 The defeat that it suffered in Vietnam 
also brought with it multifaceted problems. It was :”an army that was suffering from the 
after effects of the war in Vietnam. In addition to both professional and morale crises at 
all levels of the Army, the trauma of Vietnam created a crisis of confidence between the 
military and the public, the Congress, and the executive branch”46.  
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Despite these problems the U.S. Army between 1973 and 1976 successfully re-invented 
itself in many respects.
47
 Perhaps most instructive in terms of the formulation of doctrine 
there can be discerned the heavy use of formative experiences, although interestingly not 
its most recent ones nor exclusively its own. This doctrinal genesis would not have been 
possible without the establishment of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
on the 1
st
 July 1973.The first commanding officer was General William De Puy. Despite 
the fact that he had been was one the senior commanders in Vietnam, the personal 
formative experience that was critical to the process of doctrinal formulation was not this 
war: “The defining experience for DePuy was his service in the European theater in 
World War 2 .As an officer in the 90
th
 Infantry Division, he was struck by the 
weaknesses of the U.S. Army: notably ,unrealistic training that did not prepare the 
soldiers properly for the battlefield and the appointment of unqualified officers….De 
Puy‟s other revelation during World War II concerned the tactical excellence of the 
German Army.”48 
The second formative experience was a war that the United States Army did not 
participate in, the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. Its timing was fortuitous in that it 
appeared to offer a contemporary example of the kind of conflict that could occur along 
what was then the inner German border. Direct evidence of the influence of this war on 
the process of doctrinal formulation can be found in a statement made by Lt General 
Orwin C.Talbott, De Puy‟s deputy who visited Israel in February 1974. After meeting 
forty-five Israeli Army officers he declared: ”Much, perhaps most important, of what we 
learnt (about the tactical aspects) is not new, but needs a re-emphasis and confirms most 
of our tactics and doctrine.”49. 
 
The result was the publication in 1976 of FM 100-5. This represented a tactical doctrine 
called Active Defense that called upon U.S. commanders to move their units and rapidly 
change the force ratio at key points. It had moved the existing doctrine beyond static 
defense or a mobile defense relying on territorial depth. In short it was the force 
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multiplier that would enable the U.S. Army to win the first battle of the next war while 
fighting superior numbers of Warsaw pact troops. In 1982 a new version of FM 100-5 
included an operational level doctrine that had been developed between 1977 and 
1981.The operational doctrine was called the Extended Battle, and was later called the 
Air-Land Battle .It is often credited with being the conceptual basis for the planning of 
Operation Desert Storm in 1991. It has also been argued that the first component of 
doctrine – weapons technology was also important in this process: ”The new systems 
based on emerging technologies ,enabled an operational doctrine that synchronized the 
engagement of the follow-on echelons with defense against the first echelon. There was 
also a need to put doctrinal and organizational muscle on the technological skeleton”50  
Finally, it is important to note that this doctrine received endorsement from the 
Bundeswehr, the main continental European army that the United States Army would 
fight with in the event of hostilities with the Warsaw Pact. This component of doctrine it 
has been shown was dependent on two others: weapons technology and the political and 
strategic situation. Furthermore, it manifested itself first at the tactical before being 
extended to the operational level.   
 
The third component is organizational and institutional interests. Initially it would appear 
that this dimension is ephemeral to doctrine in a way that is the converse of weapons 
technology. Doctrine, in a normative sense, is a result of the successful response to the 
premier question. From it an armed force can conceive a form of war that is considered 
best suited to a particular conflict. Once this process has been successfully completed, 
there is a requirement for an organizational and institutional structure to sustain it. An 
insight to this relationship was given in an anonymous article that was published in 1911. 
Corbett was probably the author. This article accused the British General Staff of failing 
to formulate a doctrine that could be adequately supported by the organization.: ”The 
General Staff selected for the Army a „method of action‟ that has failed to give it a 
„doctrine of war‟, not  because it has formed no particular „conception of war‟, but 
because it does not consider the organization and administration of the army as yet quite 
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adequate to the tasks which would be imposed on it by the form of war that it considers 
the best”.51  
 
Another aspect of this component could be described as internal culture. This can play an 
important role in military innovation: ”The services that innovated with considerable 
success in the interwar period possessed internal cultures that encouraged debate, study, 
and honest experimentation in their preparations for war. Professional military education 
was clearly a part of the process ;so was serious study and writing…..The German army 
particularly encouraged its officers to engage in serious debate”52. 
 
Internal culture can also have a negative impact on the effectiveness of doctrine. The 
British Army of the inter-war period provides an instructive example of this. Despite 
being accused of failing to study the lessons of the First World War
53
 there is a wealth of 
evidence to suggest a contrary conclusion :”The General Staff promulgated its initial 
thoughts on the lessons of the Great War as early as 1920,when it published the first post-
war edition of the Field Service Regulations. Two amended editions followed in the 
1920s,the second in 1924 and the third in 1929”54.Furthermore, it can be suggested that  
by the end of this decade the General staff had developed a tactical combined arms 
doctrine based on combat experience of the First World War, and post war developments. 
Surprise coupled with the deployment of technology generated firepower and the 
minimal use of manpower was seen as the pathway to victory in future wars.  
 
Yet this doctrine failed to find expression owing to two factors. First there was a lack of 
new weapons systems that would enable this new doctrine to be validated by training. 
However, this was not a problem that was unique to the British Army. The Reichswehr 
lacked modern equipment in the same way, yet they did not have the same problem of 
validating their doctrine through training. Why was this so? The answer lies in the second  
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factor. Any attempt by the General Staff to impose a common understanding of the 
combined arms doctrine was undermined by a weak management and inspection system: 
”The interpretation of doctrine was apt to change with every posting of a senior 
officer”.55Added to this the tactical training of junior officers was devolved to unit 
commanders and their second-in-commands. The consequence was that quality of the 
doctrinal understanding and training acquired a huge disparity between individual units. 
This problem was not systematically addressed until July 1939.This was too late to make 
any difference to the operational performance of the British Expeditionary Force in 1940.  
 
The third factor is something that affects all organizations whose role is to prepare for 
and fight wars. Their efforts to formulate, disseminate, and implement doctrine are 
frequently challenged by two of the other components of doctrine: changing geostrategic 
circumstances and technological innovation. This has given rise to a remarkably 
pessimistic assessment by Sir Michael Howard as to whether militaries can actually be 
counted on to become effective learning institutions: ”I am tempted to declare 
dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got 
it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong 
.What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives”.56The 
capacity to be a learning institution can also affected by another component of doctrine-
national culture. Sir Michael Howard illustrates this with trenchant criticism of the 
culture that has been dominant in British Isles : ”Still do not let me give too much 
encouragement to that English vice of laziness masquerading as pragmatism. The 
appalling dictum of the lazy man, that the British Army loses all battles except the last, 
glosses over a vast quantity of misery and bloodshed, not least at the expense of Britain‟s 
allies”.57   The influence of organizational and institutional factors is something that can 
manifest itself at all three levels of war. In particular it can impede the development of a 
tactical doctrine and the appropriate command philosophy which is critical to the 
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transitory quality that tactics need if they are to have operational effect and achieve 
strategic objectives.  
 
Ideology from the perspective of armed forces in Western liberal democracies, initially 
appears to be an anomaly as far as doctrine is concerned. Yet it has been a critical 
element of doctrine since the end of the eighteenth century: ”It is ideology, the secular 
variant of religion that has exerted the most potent influence over strategic policy during 
the past two centuries. The French Revolution and the nearly quarter century of war that 
ensued set the tone for the twentieth century. Secular religions particularly plagued the 
first half of our century and came close to breaking the back of Western civilization 
during World War II ”58 In terms of how it has manifested itself ideology has had the 
greatest impact at the strategic level and it will be shown that it can have an impact at the 
operational and tactical level. This component can be likened to what T.S. Elliot 
described in one of his poems as a „wilderness of mirrors‟. It offered the solace of a 
distorted reality. In the twentieth century one of the best, although not the only, 
illustration of this was Nazi Germany. This was a regime that developed an ideology of 
International Relations that stressed the notion of a Social Darwinist struggle for survival. 
In terms of strategic objectives there was an emphasis of a war for Lebensraum (living 
space) in the East. War and military preparations was a factor that suffused both German 
society and its foreign policy. It had done so, with a less lurid vocabulary, even during 
the reign of  Wilhelm 11, and this complemented a military tradition that went back to the 
Second Reich.
59
 
 
The success of the Wehrmacht in Poland and the Norway and then France and the Low 
countries was based on the successful use of a combined arms warfare doctrine which 
facilitated the innovative and very efficient employment of limited resources. The 
invasion of Russia with the launch of Operation Barbarossa in June 22 1941 marked a 
discontinuity that was to have important implications for the ideological component. First 
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the gross underestimation of the logistical problems of invading Russia meant that the 
doctrine of combined arms warfare could not be adequately supported beyond December 
1941, when the German offensive was halted in the suburbs of Moscow. Secondly, the 
attack on Russia had an ideological dimension to it that had been absent from previous 
offensives in the West. From the beginning the war in Russia was characterized as a 
Weltanchauungskrieg-a war of ideology. This aspect of the conflict could be sustained 
relatively easily in the German Army which was an organization already adept at using 
radio, film, written propaganda to convey important messages to its soldiers.
60
 
 
As the gap in resources and technology between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht 
widened in 1942-1943, the transitory power of the latter‟s tactical doctrine was 
increasingly challenged. A consequence of this there  was an increasing recourse by the 
leadership of the Third Reich to inserting ideology into the command structure. The aim 
was to explain the political situation and harden morale of German soldiers. For example: 
”On 22nd December 1943 Hitler issued an order establishing „NS-Fuehrungsstab‟in the 
OKW which made for the creation of „National Socialist Leadership Officers‟(NSFO) in 
all military staffs down to divisional level. Thus ended a gradual process, begun almost 
ten years earlier, of an ideological and institutional penetration of the army by the Nazi 
party”.61Some divisions of the German Army had company commanders conduct bi-
weekly ideology sessions with their men. This increased emphasis on propaganda was 
combined with a belief in the Fuhrer by German soldiers
62
.This had the effect of 
stiffening their morale, even in defeat. Yet ultimately it did not prove an antidote to the 
greatest challenge that the German Army faced from 1942 onto onwards which was that 
of the process of de-modernisation. In a perverse way the increased emphasis on ideology 
between 1942 and 1943 can be interpreted as a substitute for combined arms warfare 
doctrine of war that could no longer generate the fighting power that it once had been 
capable of. Ideology, which seemed a force multiplier when things went well, gave the 
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German High Command a very poor alternative to attaining operational effect and  
reaching strategic objectives.      
 
If the armed forces of any country are a product of the society that produced them  
national culture is a component of doctrine. Yet this proposition presents a number of 
problems. First the concept of culture is both contested and unbounded. Culture means  
anthropology, historical sociology, international security, organization theory, 
psychology, sociology and social theory. Any concept and definition of culture is 
problematic. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz in the Weber tradition states that: ”Man 
is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun”.63 In short, people 
live in a symbolic world that they themselves have socially constructed or inherited and  
action is taken in this symbolic environment. Cultural explanation according to this 
approach is based on signs, symbols and their interpretation. With respect to national 
culture and doctrine this raises the question as to whether the former should be seen as 
context as Colin Gray has suggested,
64
Alistair Finlan has suggested another relationship 
between a specific fighting organization and national culture: ” They share much in 
common, from an explicit focus on identity and an awareness of the power of social 
construction and the influence of ideas, norms, values as well as identity in shaping 
preferences .An important historical linkage between the two areas has been in relation to 
the significance of doctrine in shaping the preferences of military establishments”.65 
Inevitably scholars who have written about this topic have taken different perspectives on 
its influence on doctrine, fighting forces and the choices of strategies: Snyder stressed the 
pressures that are generated within a particular military organization
66
. Posen laid a far 
greater emphasis on the political elite of a particular country and the balance of power 
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within the international system.
67
 Finally, Rosen invoked external factors and 
technology.
68
 
 
What is instructive about Finlan‟s ideas is that he then qualifies the proposition about 
doctrine shaping preferences: ”The causal chain  between doctrine as an independent 
variable and strategy as a dependent variable is not at all assured, even more so, in times 
of conflict”69. 
 
 If the weapons technology component of doctrine can generate fighting power only 
when it is employed within a certain conceptual framework, then a similar claim can be 
made for national culture. It provides a crucial context that can have both negative and 
positive implications for the formulation, dissemination implementation of doctrine.      
Not only is an interdisciplinary approach unavoidable in explaining this approach, but it 
has also been argued that these diverse factors are in turn refracted through the prism of 
constitutional arrangements: ”The measures which communities adopt for their defense 
are intimately connected with their internal political structure, and in consequence with 
their traditions and their ideas”.70  
 
The negative effects of this component are illustrated by returning to the British Army in 
the inter-war period. The Field Service Regulations of the 1920s and 1930s articulated 
general principles. They did not prescribe how those principles should be applied. Instead 
this responsibility was devolved to senior officers on the assumption   that 
implementation would require a combination of judgement and experience. Part of the 
reason for this were the strategic realities of the British Empire:  pulled between 
preparing to fight a European war and colonial garrisoning duties. However, David 
French has claimed that national culture was also an important driver: ”This indulgent 
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approach to the interpretation of doctrine was also the creation of a particular notion of 
what it meant to be „British‟ that had developed since the eighteenth century. It was 
widely assumed that one of the factors that set the British apart from the Germans or 
French, and made them superior was the fact that their actions were determined by 
„character‟ not abstract reason and prescriptive rules…a readiness to muddle through was 
a trait that was supposed to distinguish the British from their continental neighbours”71. 
This idea of character in this sense was also linked to a unique conception of liberty; 
”Our liberty is neither Greek nor Roman ,but essentially English. It has a character of its 
own”72.The debate between this British emphasis on character, and the subsequent 
erosion of a prescriptive nature of doctrine is not new. In 1911 a plea was registered 
against the 1910 Memorandum on Army Training. Character, it was argued was the 
implicit factor that mitigated against the construction of a sound doctrinal bridge: ”Our 
General Staff, unlike those of France and Germany, has not taken the opportunity 
presented to it(assessing the Russo-Japanese War) to impress seriously upon the Army 
the soundness of that doctrine of war which is the logical and necessary spiritual link 
between the methods it advocates in Field Service Regulations and the parent conception 
of war which is the sole justification for adopting any particular method of action”.73            
 
This debate also underlined how the negative aspect of this component can contribute to 
doctrinal failure at a tactical level. One of the key functions of training is that it should 
validate doctrine. This should be the business of a General Staff. They can facilitate 
dissemination and implementation: ”It is among the first duties of the General Staff of a 
great modern national army to indoctrinate it with a clear conception of the basic 
principles of war, and of the method on which it intends to apply those principles to the 
conduct of national war”74. What is interesting about national culture as a component of 
doctrine is that its effects are counter intuitive in terms of the level of war. It is natural to 
assume that this aspect would impact at the strategic and operational level at the most. 
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Yet as the British inter-war example clearly showed its implications manifested 
themselves at the tactical level.                 
  
The final component, the political and strategic situation, infuses a geostrategic
75
 
dimension into doctrine. This aspect brings a unique challenge that the armed forces of a 
particular country have to confront. There is always one constant that remains: human 
dependence on a geographical base for existence. However, it is the changing conditions 
that determine how territory will be exploited, contested and defined. It would initially 
appear that this component would only affect the strategic and operational levels of war. 
 
Germany offers a good example of this. From the inception of a united Germany in 1871 
a new strategic situation was brought in to being :”Central Europe was now united for the 
first time in modern history under the Hohenzollerns, who commanded the finest army in 
Europe and the world”.76 Yet military thinkers such as the elder von Moltke had a 
perceptive grasp of the fact that this new state faced a lethal strategic scenario of a 
Franco-Russian alliance that could result in a war in two fronts. He also recognized that 
there was no easy solution, in terms of military planning, to these dilemmas. Yet he was 
to do his best to find one. The intensive diplomacy of Bismarck with respect to other 
European powers clearly had its limitations. The problem arose with the accession of 
Wilhelm II to the throne in 1890, and the desire of a group of General Staff officers 
around Count von Schlieffen to bring about a rapid decision on the battlefield through 
manoeuvre and encirclement: ”Moltke‟s plans in this situation were in line with his 
strategy in the past namely to fight one enemy with as little as possible in order to make 
available superior forces with which to crush the other. His advice was to stay on the 
defensive in the west and to take the offensive against Russia. Germany, in possession of 
Alsace-Lorraine, could defend her western frontier with small forces whereas she could 
not hope to achieve rapid decisions against the rising line of French fortifications. Greater 
results could be hoped for in Russia. Moltke‟s second successor as chief of the general 
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staff, Count Schlieffen, reversed the sequence in 1894; from that time on, the German 
plans for a two-front war envisaged making the first offensive in the west”77.  
This approach to the political and strategic situation that Germany found itself in did have 
an effect on the framework that German tactical doctrine developed in .This was 
discerned by writers before the First World War: ”The German method, which in itself is 
a perfectly logical whole springing from a conception of war in which the ruling factors 
are held to be seizing and maintaining the initiative at all costs and the envelopment of an 
enemy whose general direction is often only surmised to avoid loss of time, and 
consequent loss of initiative, in more accurate verification”78. 
 
In the interwar period under von Seeckt a doctrine was developed that was based on 
manoeuvre and the rapid annihilation of the enemy force. The other assumption that was 
made was that the German Army could be rapidly re- equipped and expanded in its 
numbers. This approach offered a chance of victory instead of the prospect of stalemate. 
Furthermore, it was not novel but rather a return to the traditions of the past: “Seeckt‟s 
conception of modern warfare was not innovative, but rather a return to traditional 
German warfare. The army had always accentuated the necessity for quick decisive 
blows. A static defence of Germany has always seemed impossible because of its 
unfavourable   geostrategic position, and its inferiority in material and numbers of men. 
The enemy armies should not be given a direct target, which they could crush by sheer 
mass”79.There was also an element of discontinuity with the past as well. He disagreed 
with von Schlieffen that fast mobilization was the key to success.
80
 Instead he placed 
emphasis on using highly mobile forces to make a first strike that would yield decisive 
results. 
 
 By December 1941 Hitler‟s invasion of Russia, and his declaration of war on the United 
States, had brought about the two front scenarios that von Moltke had identified. The  
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critical difference was the geographical scope of Germany‟s new enemies. This scope 
brought about an increase in the material and human resources, plus the technology that 
was to be deployed and used against Germany. The result was that the considerable  
tactial and operational virtuosity of the Germany Army was progressively subjected to a 
dual force: de-modernisation and the loss of the transiting quality in its tactical doctrine. 
           
 
In conclusion a three fold analysis has been adopted in this article. Doctrine as an object 
of thought has been evaluated , as well as the two main variants of command philosophy. 
Secondly, the synthetic nature of the relationship between doctrine and command 
philosophy has been assessed .It has been hypothesized that they are part of what Fry has 
described as a compound alignment. This relationship between doctrine and command 
philosophy is seen as critical by practitioners. Ironically it is completely absent from one 
of the most recent surveys of doctrine and the British armed forces.
81
In a perceptive 
examination of British doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan there was no reference made to 
the kind of command philosophy that was being applied to these two operations: ”This 
disquiet was twofold :first there was frustration born of the lack of strategic direction in 
Iraq and Afghanistan ;second there was a palpable loss of confidence in the robustness of 
the doctrinal foundations supporting British military operations.”82 It is the relationship 
between doctrine and command philosophy that contributes greatly to the ability to 
generate  fighting power. “If doctrine is the epoxy the commander‟s way of command in 
the circumstances is the hardener”83. The importance of aligning doctrine and command 
philosophy at the tactical level is paramount. However, writers such as Geoffrey Till have 
generated only confusion as to which command philosophy can generate fighting power 
when harnessed to doctrine:” There is the balance to be struck between centralized 
control and that form of delegated authority that has become known as „mission 
command‟ of the sort associated with Nelson.”84Moreover a recent insightful article on 
the challenges that British command philosophy has faced in Iraq and Afghanistan makes 
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only one attempt to explain the relationship with doctrine: ”The independence of these in-
theatre commanders may be explained by reference to the introduction into the British 
army of the concept of „mission command‟ following Field Marshall Nigel Bagnell‟s  
doctrinal reforms in the mid to late 1980s.”85             
 
The third aspect of evaluation has identified the existence of an important lacuna in the 
theory of doctrine. Gooch argued that the six components of doctrine came together 
differently in each and every case. They represented a “cocktail” in terms of affecting the 
formulation, dissemination, and implementation of doctrine
86
.What has been shown is 
how the different components have manifested themselves at the tactical, operational, and 
strategic levels of war, and the linkages that exist between these components.  
 
Corbett‟s aphorism of  doctrine being the soul of warfare does underline a crucial 
continuity from the past to the present and into the future. This continuity can be 
described as the premier Clausewitzian question
87
. What is the nature of the conflict that 
statesmen and commanders they find themselves engaged in? It is in the process of 
answering this question that we have the departure point for the formulation of doctrine 
and the subsequent command philosophy. The ongoing operation in Afghanistan 
illustrates this point well.: ”The offensive is, in many ways, a distillation of a 
counterinsurgency doctrine that General McChrystal and his team have been shaping 
since arriving in Afghanistan last summer”88. The use of doctrine like strategic thinking is 
heavily context dependent. This is one of the factors that makes doctrine such a transient 
phenomenon. It is also important underline the point that the utility of doctrine is still  
contested in the literature. It has been interpreted as being devoid of the ability to 
generate fighting power and thus facilitate military success : ”With each conflict being 
fought according to quite different political, military and legal requirements from the last, 
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the question might be asked: how can doctrine be guaranteed to give us the keys to 
success on the battlefield? The answer to the question is that it cannot.”89 
  
 The importance of Corbett‟s wisdom is that it provided, and continues to provide, 
a pathway to illuminate the continuing importance of senior commanders and policy 
makers of correctly answering the premier Clausewitzian question. The centrality of this 
for the formulation of doctrine is ignored by a fighting organization at its peril. 
 The components of doctrine are not restricted to steering transition from the 
tactical level to achieving operational effect and strategic objectives. These components 
at the strategic and operational level can present commanders with difficult challenges at 
the tactical level. In summary doctrine irrespective of the level at which it manifests itself 
is pivotal to success in war. This is not exactly a new claim or insight:” There is little or 
no exaggeration in the assertion that without doctrine large military operations cannot be 
carried on satisfactorily against a strong and active foe ,and that the influence of doctrine 
upon victory is profound”.90 
Allied to the investigation of the different components of doctrine , the 
importance of applying the appropriate command philosophy has been emphasized. As 
stated previously it is this synthesis that generates fighting power. They are like two 
halves of a banknote each is useless without the other. Of the two command philosophies, 
the application of „mission command‟ is by far the most challenging. It  requires certain 
qualities in an officer corps. Among them is the ability to think holistically, and the 
willingness to take initiatives and pursue them despite adversity. This in turn underlines 
the importance of an officer corps to these matters: ”If it is indeed true ,as is so often said 
,that the officer corps counts for everything in war.”91  
A paradigm of doctrine has been developed that would in the future lend itself to 
being tested by a number of case studies. The use of historical material would illuminate 
the nature of the thought required to arrive at the conception of war, and establish what 
kind of doctrines came out of a particular conception. The subsequent doctrines and their 
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accompanying command philosophies could be analyzed for an understanding of the role 
of both deductive and inductive approaches in this process. It would also illuminate 
further the critical ability of an armed force to generate fighting power. A knowledge 
about the relationship between doctrine and command philosophy would enable an 
evaluation to be made of  how effectively the premier question has been posed and 
answered. 
 
